Princeton prof: e-voting machines easily hackable

With election shenanigans fresh in our minds from 2004, shouldn't we be concerned over the integrity of voting machines. Furthermore, manufacturers and politicians have resisted requirements that electronic voting machines give receipts to the voter users. This would give the voter, and the greater public, a little bit more confidence in such machines. This is amidst recent reports, in several states, of vote flipping (or vote switching) by e-voting machines.

Princeton computer science professor Andrew Appel has publicized a 158 page report that criticizes certain e-voting machines as easily hackable, "Computerworld" reported October 27.
Todd R. Weiss, "Princeton report rips N.J. e-voting machines as easily hackable
Vendor challenges research, says its machines are safe and reliable"

With eight days to go before the presidential election, a report has been released by Princeton University and other groups that sharply criticizes the e-voting machines used in New Jersey and elsewhere as unreliable and potentially prone to hacking.

The 158-page report, which was ordered by a New Jersey judge as part of an ongoing four-year legal fight over the machines, says the e-voting machines can be "easily hacked" in about seven minutes by anyone with basic computer knowledge. Such hacking activity could enable fraudulent firmware to steal votes from one candidate and give them to another, the report said.

The controversy involves the Sequoia AVC Advantage 9.00H direct-recording electronic (DRE) touch-screen voting machines made by Oakland, Calif.-based Sequoia Voting Systems.

The report comes amid news stories in at least three states -- West Virginia, Texas and Tennessee -- where voters have told local election officials that they believe the e-voting machines they used tried to "flip" their votes to other candidates.

The AVC machines can be hacked by installing fraudulent software contained in a replacement chip that can be installed on the main circuit board, according to the report. Such a part replacement is very difficult to detect, it noted.

Andrew Appel, a Princeton University computer science professor who is one of the authors of the report, said that such security vulnerabilities cause doubts about the accuracy and reliability of the machines.

The plaintiffs, a group of public interest organizations, argue in their lawsuit against the state of New Jersey that the machines should be discarded because they can't meet state election law requirements for security and accuracy. State officials who back the machines argue that the machines are adequate for the job.

The lawsuit is expected to go to trial in January, but in the meantime, the court allowed the Princeton report to be released to the public.

The report gives details on how the machines could be manipulated by someone who wanted to change the results of the election, and it strongly criticizes the designs and security of the devices.

Read the 158 page report here, in pdf format.